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It is a high-profile great event that mixed ownership reform in the current China’s economic reform and development.In order to carry the mixed ownership reform forward the deep water area,this paper made comprehensive evaluation on the effect of mixed ownership reform and innovation of 67 typical representative administrative monopoly listed companies from 2006 to 2015.In order to explore the relationship between the performance and mixed ownership reform of administrative monopoly company,this study found that the performance of telecom and oil industries which state-owned equity ratios were higher presented the downward trend and the performance of air transport and electricity industries which state-owned equity ratios were relatively low presented overall stable although fluctuated.Made Use of corporate financial performance model and input-output model which measured the relationship between ownership structure and the performance,this paper discovered that there was no significant correlation between equity concentration(or dispersion)and corporate performance,there was significant correlation between State-owned equity and corporate performance,there was weak correlation between foreign equity and corporate financial performance while strong correlation between foreign equity and the output,and there was only significantly correlation between the domestic private equity and the next issue of corporate performance.Made use of 11390 data of 67 listed companies,this paper constructed ownership check-and-balance model to explore its impact on performance.The results showed that the check-and-balance degree of non-state ownership kept stable,the performance measure index of operating revenue was affected significantly by foreign ownership check-and- balance degree but not the domestic private equity balance degree and it was impossible to judge the relation between ROA and equity check-and-balance in the same way.It showed that the check-and-balance function of non-state ownership was not yet perfect and non-state shareholders tended to hitchhiking.This study deepened the cognition that the evaluation index of mixed ownership reform should be diversified rather than simplified.In order to compare the direct innovation contribution between administrative monopoly industries and competitive industries,this paper made use of data from 2011 to 2013,analyzed such input items as R&D personnel and expenses,the number and funds of project,the expenditure of technology acquisition and technology transformation,the number of new product development projects and its spending and analyzed such output items as the number of patent application as well as invention patents,the number of effective invention patents,income of new products etc.The results showed that 6 administrative monopoly industries were lower than competitive industries of these 2 dimensionalities.The innovation efficiency of the two kinds industries was nearly the same by the measure of the efficiency of patent application and new product sales revenue.Some scholars believed that the innovation ability of state-owned enterprise was the lowest.This paper discussed the definition of state-owned enterprises,analyzed other scholars’ process of argumentation and its conclusion and even to explore afresh the hypothesis of “economic man”.It selected the micro data of Chinese auto parts and accessories manufacturing in competitive industries,contrasted and analyzes the innovation of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises listed companies by use of the Malmquist Index.The result showed that the overall innovation ability of state-owned enterprises was higher instead than private enterprises and each subdivided enterprises had its strong point.At last,we think that the two opposite judgment may be paradox.Those scholars’ judgment resulted from the black or white thinking and judgment model of traditional economics.It was dew to the nature of ownership and the choice of human nature as well as their acting together that resulted in low innovation ability of state-owned enterprise or high.For the sake of the relationship between innovation of administrative monopoly enterprises and mixed ownership reform,this paper contrasted the innovation status as well as its influencing factors of five administrative monopoly industries directly and found that the R&D investment of telecommunications industry and oil industry were huge and the R&D intensity were stable.The ownership concentration of them were greater than 50% and the proportion of state-owned equity were both more than 70%.There was rare R&D investment of air transportation industry and only 42.86% of the electric power company which had invested on R&D.The ownership concentrations of the latter two industries were both less than 30% and their state-owned equity accounted for both less than 60%.This paper made use of Tobit model on discrete R&D intensity and FGLS estimates on the Malmquist Index and found that R&D intensity was only related to ownership concentration significantly while the relationship between TFP and the ownership structure was not significant,there were significantly relationship between innovation of the two measures and company growing,the Assets scale was be conducive to increasing the R&D concentrations but made no contribution to improving TFP and the employee scale contributed to improve TFP but do little to enhancing R&D intensity.The inner income gap problem of administrative monopoly enterprises induced great social focus after the mixed ownership reform.This book made use of 10 years listed company financial data from 2006 to 2015 annual report,compared inner income gap of 6 typical representative of administrative monopoly industries,and by means of the competition theory and behavior theory,designed the econometric model.It discovered that the ownership concentration was highly related to the pay gap between executives but unrelated to the pay gap between executives and employees,the state-owned equity accounted was significant negative correlation with the two kinds of pay gap and non-state equity accounted was only significantly negative correlation with the pay gap between executives and employees.This paper also designed a comprehensive index to evaluate effect of mixed ownership reform and measured the mixed reform effect of the 5 administrative monopoly industries.The result showed that the mixed reform brought limited performance level and poor innovation ability effect.Finally,this study put forward corresponding policy recommendations.Firstly,we should understand and evaluate the mixed ownership reform correctly,the purpose of mixed ownership reform should be realized by optimizing corporate governance structure,system and mechanism,the evaluation index of its effect should be diversified rather than simplified,we should carry on environment regulation to supervise administrative monopoly enterprises increasing investment in innovation and promoted the reform through comprehensive innovation.Key Words:Mixed Ownership Reform;Ownership Structure;Ownership Structure Check-and-balance;Administrative Monopoly;Performance;Innovation
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林峰(1978—),男,山东东阿人,山东大学经济学博士,副教授。研究方向为反垄断与规制经济学,近年在《财经科学》《软科学》《西北农林科技大学学报》(社会科学版)等学术期刊上发表论文十数篇。
第一章 绪论一 问题的提出(一)新常态下行政垄断企业混合所有制改革的效果需要及时总结与评价
(二)进一步推动行政垄断企业混合所有制改革需要创新驱动
(三)国有企业的混合所有制改革与发展创新是保障中国摆脱世界经济低迷影响的不可忽视的坚实基础
二 相关概念的界定(一)行政垄断
(二)行政垄断行业与企业
(三)混合所有制改革
(四)创新
三 主要内容与研究框架(一)主要内容
(二)研究框架
四 基本思路与研究方法(一)基本思路
(二)研究方法
五 拟突破的重点和难点(一)拟突破的重点
(二)拟攻克的难点
六 主要创新点
七 其他需要说明的重要问题
第二章 行政垄断企业混合所有制改革与绩效一 文献综述与研究假设(一)股权结构与企业绩效的相关研究对象缺少行政垄断企业
(二)托宾Q比率(Tobin’s Q)并不适合用来衡量行政垄断上市公司的市场价值
(三)对于股权构成应该混合到什么程度没有统一的认识
(四)对混合所有制股权构成与绩效关系的判断各执一词
(五)对混合所有制改革效果的分析
二 研究设计与数据描述(一)基本模型
(二)变量设计
(三)分行业统计描述
三 计量结果与分析(一)财务绩效模型
(二)投入产出效率模型
(三)假设验证
四 结论与政策含义(一)国有股权与公司财务绩效的关系
(二)股权结构与公司绩效变化的深层次探讨
第三章 行政垄断企业混合所有制股权制衡与绩效一 文献综述、理论分析与研究假设(一)文献综述
(二)理论分析与研究假设
三 数据整理与统计描述(一)电信业ROA与股权制衡度统计描述
(二)石油业ROA与股权制衡度统计描述
(三)铁路运输业ROA与股权制衡度统计描述
(四)航空运输业ROA与股权制衡度统计描述
(五)电力业ROA与股权制衡度统计描述
(六)小结
四 测算结果与观点探讨(一)以营业收入作为绩效指标
(二)以总资产收益率作为绩效指标
五 本章结论与政策含义(一)混合所有制改革的目的应通过优化公司治理架构、制度和机制来实现
(二)国有股权作为行政垄断行业企业的主体,更应主动关注内部治理机制的升级与改善,发挥非国有股东的监督制衡作用
(三)应设计多元化而不是单一化的评价股权制衡效果的评价指标
第四章 行政垄断企业创新能力探究一 行政垄断行业与竞争性行业直接创新贡献度的比较测度(一)引言
(二)文献综述
(三)模型设定
(四)数据说明
(五)创新直接投入贡献度
(六)创新直接产出贡献度
(七)小结
二 行政垄断行业与竞争性行业直接创新效率的比较测度(一)专利申请效率
(二)新产品销售收入效率
(三)小结
三 本章小结
第五章 所有制类型与创新能力差异的测度比较一 文献述评(一)国有企业的范围界定太过狭隘,研究过程与所得结论之间不存在确定的关系
(二)区分所有制类型研究得到的都是“笼统”结论,并没有照顾到特殊案例
(三)辩证分析国有企业的创新能力和效果并不差
(四)经济人假设的假设即人性自利特质之“衡态”是否存在悖论
二 评价指标与样本数据选择(一)评价指标:Malmquist指数
(二)国有企业的界定、样本和数据选择
(三)投入产出指标的设定
(四)消胀指标
三 测算结果及其分析(一)总体对比发现,国有企业创新能力实则“微高”
(二)细分企业对比发现,国企与私企各有千秋
四 结论(一)在汽车零部件及配件制造业,国企创新能力更高,这与“国企创新能力最低”成为悖论
(二)非此即彼的传统经济学“点理性”思维和判断研究模式是否应适时变通和调整
(三)是所有制属性还是人性取舍导致国有企业创新能力“低”或“高”
第六章 行政垄断企业混合所有制改革与创新一 文献综述(一)企业整体产权性质与企业内部产权性质是两个不同的概念
(二)对于国企创新能力高低的争论莫衷一是
(三)对混合所有制企业创新能力的讨论
(四)创新的评价指标
三 数据的描述性统计与创新指标测算(一)以研发投入情况衡量创新的分行业统计描述
(二)以曼奎斯特指数(Malmquist Index)衡量的创新情况
四 测算结果与检验(一)离散变量随机效应Tobit模型
(二)连续变量回归模型
五 本章小结(一)以研发为创新衡量指标,国有股权占比较高的公司研发强度较高;仅股权集中度与创新显著正相关,股权构成与创新关系不显著
(二)以全要素生产率为创新度量指标,67家行政垄断企业的全要素生产率指标均值小于1,10年间不但没有创新,反而落伍了;股权结构与之关系不显著,但混合主体深入性与之关系显著
第七章 混合所有制改革与薪酬激励一 文献综述(一)锦标赛理论
(二)行为理论
(三)认为薪酬差距与股权性质的相关性很高的研究
(四)关于高管薪酬与员工薪酬差距的研究
(五)混合所有制股权结构与薪酬激励、内部收入差距
二 数据说明和预处理
三 股权结构变化与行业内部收入差距变化对比(一)电信业
(二)铁路运输业(3家代表)
(三)航空运输业
(四)石油和天然气开采业
(五)电力和热力行业
(六)银行业
(七)6大行业股权结构与收入差距的变化趋势对比
(八)其他特别需要说明的情况:石油和天然气开采业未统计中国海洋石油的情况
(九)各自行业内部高管与员工之间的平均收入差距情况
四 混合所有制背景下薪酬激励与绩效关系的测度(一)研究假设与模型设计
(二)变量设定
(三)计量回归结果与检验
五 内部收入差距合理化的数量标准问题
六 结论与研究的局限性
第八章 混合所有制改革有效性的指标评价体系设计与测度一 混合所有制改革有效性评价指标的设计原则(一)混合所有制改革有效性的衡量标准
(二)混合所有制改革有效性的衡量维度
二 具体衡量标准(一)生产效率变化情况
(二)总资产收益率(ROA)变化情况
(三)营业收入增长率变化情况
(四)总资产增长率变化情况
(五)创新能力变化情况
三 测度结果(一)电信业
(二)电力业
(三)石油业
(四)铁路运输业
(五)航空运输业
(六)创新能力
四 5大行业混合所有制改革有效性评价情况
第九章 结论、政策建议与研究展望一 结论(一)行政垄断企业混合所有制股权结构改革并未带来企业绩效的显著改善
(二)行政垄断企业混合所有制股权制衡程度基本稳定,对绩效影响有限
(三)与竞争性行业相比,行政垄断行业创新贡献度很低,而创新效率相差无几
(四)国有股权属性不应成为判断国有企业创新能力高低的指标
(五)行政垄断企业混合所有制股权结构与创新的关系并不显著
(六)使用生产效率、管理效率、ROA、营业收入增长率、总资产增长率以及创新能力作为评价指标,得出行政垄断行业“混改”的效果有待于进一步提高
(七)独立董事和资产规模均对企业财务业绩起抑制作用
二 政策建议(一)正确认识混合所有制改革
(二)混合所有制改革的目的应通过优化公司治理架构、制度和机制来实现
(三)处理好混合所有制条件下“按劳分配”与“按资分配”的关系
(四)通过环境规制,督促行政垄断企业加大创新投入,通过综合创新促进改革
(五)应设计多元化而不是单一化的评价“混改”效果的评价指标
三 本书研究的不足之处
四 进一步研究展望(一)深入剖析制约行政垄断行业创新的“内外”瓶颈、机制,重点研究其与竞争性行业创新机制的区别或差距
(二)提炼成熟市场化国家经验的可资借鉴之处
(三)探寻混合所有制企业最优股权结构及其优化调整机制
(四)深刻探讨混合所有制主体的生态适应性问题
(五)探索优化新常态下混合所有制企业的公司治理方式
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